The Belarusian regime persecutes former political prisoners not only inside the country but also beyond its borders. Following the mass repression that began after the 2020 presidential election, many Belarusians were forced to leave the country, while political persecution became one of the defining features of the Belarusian crisis. Restrictions on consular services, trials in absentia, property-related risks, and pressure on relatives allow the regime to retain leverage over people who have already fled. For a significant number of former political prisoners, fleeing the country was the only way to avoid renewed persecution. For many Belarusians who fled political persecution, their situation directly engages the international protection framework of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This framework applies where people have a well-founded fear of persecution, including for political reasons, and are unable or unwilling, because of that fear, to seek the protection of their country of origin. Many left Belarus after arrests, prison sentences, threats of new criminal charges, and constant surveillance by the security services. Decisions were often made within days or even hours. Many departed without any opportunity to prepare for life abroad. They had no time to arrange powers of attorney, sell property, recover documents, resolve banking or inheritance issues, or obtain medical records. As a result, a substantial part of their personal and legal documentation remained within the Belarusian system. The UN Special Rapporteur on Belarus has documented how restrictions on passports, powers of attorney, education and property continue to affect Belarusians living abroad.
The specificity of the Belarusian case lies in the combination of instruments and the mechanism they create. The authorities restrict access to documents and legal procedures abroad, require a return to Belarus for certain essential procedures, pursue people through trials in absentia, retain leverage over their property and relatives, and can disguise politically motivated cases as ordinary criminal prosecutions to activate international police and legal cooperation. Together, these instruments allow the State to exercise coercive power over people beyond its territory.
This is not an internal Belarusian issue. It directly affects many European states, particularly Poland, Lithuania, and other countries that host Belarusians forced to flee persecution. When a person cannot safely return to obtain a passport, a power of attorney, a child’s documents, or property-related paperwork, their vulnerability becomes not only a humanitarian concern but also a matter of European legal policy.
Document Dependence
The problem extends far beyond passports. For former political prisoners, it affects nearly the entire infrastructure of everyday civic life: children’s birth certificates, marriage and divorce records, diplomas and educational archives, proof of employment history, medical records, disability documentation, powers of attorney, property documents, vehicle registration papers, bank records, and inheritance documents.
For former political prisoners, access to these documents directly affects their ability to rebuild their lives abroad. Without them, people may be unable to manage property, prove their education and work experience, settle inheritance matters, resolve family-related issues, or complete legal and administrative procedures. As a result, the lack of documentation can leave former political prisoners dependent on decisions made by the Belarusian authorities even after leaving the country. This situation overlaps with the concept of de facto statelessness: people may remain Belarusian citizens in law while being unable, or for valid reasons unwilling, to rely on the protection and consular assistance of their State abroad.
Decree No. 278
Before 2023, Belarusians could resolve many document- and property-related issues through consular services abroad. This changed after the adoption of Presidential Decree No. 278 of 4 September 2023, which significantly restricted access to a range of administrative and notarial services outside Belarus. Following its entry into force, the issuance and renewal of ordinary passports, ID cards, and biometric passports became possible only inside Belarus. At the same time, a number of property-related procedures, including real estate and vehicle transactions, became tied either to a person’s physical presence in Belarus or to a power of attorney issued within the country.
For former political prisoners, these restrictions create more than administrative difficulties. Returning to Belarus to resolve issues that can now only be addressed inside the country may expose them to detention, interrogation, renewed criminal prosecution, or pressure from the security services. These consequences extend far beyond consular procedures. Restrictions on access to essential documents affect a person’s legal status, the exercise of fundamental rights, and the ability to live, work, and build a stable life outside Belarus.
Presidential Decree No. 278 made access to key documents and legally significant procedures dependent on returning to Belarus. Before its adoption, many of these issues could be resolved through Belarusian consulates abroad. After the Decree entered into force, they became possible only inside Belarus. For people who cannot return safely because of the risk of political persecution, the exercise of ordinary civil rights is now directly linked to the risk of detention, renewed criminal prosecution, or other forms of State pressure. In practice, this transforms an administrative procedure into a mechanism for maintaining State control over Belarusian citizens living abroad.
The 1951 Refugee Convention expressly addresses the situation of a person who, because of a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. The State whose protection Belarusians should be able to rely on is itself ruled by the regime that persecutes them. Article 25 provides that where the exercise of a right requires assistance from authorities to whom a refugee cannot have recourse, such administrative assistance must be provided by the host State.
Property as an Instrument of Pressure
The issue of documentation is closely connected with property. Many former political prisoners continue to own apartments, houses, vehicles, bank accounts, inheritance rights, and other assets in Belarus that remain under Belarusian jurisdiction. Following the restrictions introduced by Decree No. 278, managing such property has become significantly more difficult.
Many property transactions require the owner’s personal presence in Belarus or a power of attorney issued within the country. As a result, property becomes more than just an and also acts as an instrument of pressure.
For this reason, many former political prisoners and other persecuted Belarusians are forced to take into account the possible consequences of their public, human rights, and political activities. Such activities may result not only in renewed criminal prosecution but also in additional consequences affecting their property, relatives, and other remaining ties with Belarus. As a result, property becomes another instrument through which the regime continues to exert pressure on people who have already left Belarus. \
These measures may interfere with rights protected under international human rights law, including the right to a fair trial, the right to property, and the right to an adequate standard of living, including housing.
Trials in Absentia, Property Confiscation, and Pressure on Relatives
In 2022, Belarus introduced a mechanism known as “special proceedings,” allowing criminal cases to be conducted against individuals residing abroad. In January 2025, UN experts expressed concern over the growing use of such proceedings. They noted that trials in absentia in Belarus lack basic fair trial guarantees and may result in lengthy prison sentences, property confiscation, and other serious consequences. According to the experts, the number of special proceedings against Belarusians abroad increased from 18 cases in 2023 to 110 cases in 2024.
The consequences of these cases extend beyond the individuals directly targeted. Even after leaving the country, many former political prisoners still have relatives and property in Belarus. In spring 2026, reports emerged of Belarusian KGB officers visiting relatives of Belarusians who had participated in protests and political activities abroad. Earlier, the Belarusian Investigative Committee announced criminal cases against participants in demonstrations outside the country and the seizure of their property.
As a result, former political prisoners must take into account not only the risks they personally face but also the potential consequences for relatives and family members who remain in Belarus.
Transnational Repression and Its Significance for Europe
States already have legal mechanisms to protect Belarusians who cannot safely rely on the protection of their country of nationality. They can grant international protection and legal residence, issue alternative identity or travel documents, recognise expired Belarusian passports, avoid requiring documents obtainable only through Belarusian authorities, protect people from return to Belarus, and refuse extradition based on politically motivated criminal proceedings or INTERPOL requests. Following the termination of the issuance and renewal of Belarusian passports abroad, some States have recognised expired Belarusian passports for certain migration and administrative procedures, while others provide special travel documents or alien’s passports. Convention Travel Documents are also available to persons granted international protection. These measures reduce the Lukashenka regime’s ability to use legal status, documentation, freedom of movement and international law-enforcement cooperation as instruments of pressure.
European States cannot eliminate the consequences of repression that depend on decisions taken inside Belarus. They cannot stop legal proceedings conducted there, prevent the regime from taking action against property located in the country, or protect relatives who remain there from pressure. These dependencies survive the granting of international protection and allow the Lukashenka regime to continue exerting pressure on people abroad.
Implementation of existing protection mechanisms remains uneven across Europe. Recognition of expired passports and access to alternative documents vary between States and between different categories of Belarusians. The existing system provides substantial protection against forms of repression that European States can address within their own jurisdictions. Pressure exercised through legal relationships that remain under Belarusian jurisdiction is considerably harder to neutralise.
N.B. The author used DeepL, an AI-assisted translation and editing tool, for translation and stylistic editing of this article, as agreed with the editorial team.
