On April 2nd 2026 the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) adopted a decision concerning the situation of enforced disappearances on Mexico (Decision, CED/C/MEX/A.34/D/1). Concretely, the Decision transmitted to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), through the UN Secretary-General (SG), the urgency to adopt certain actions to ensure the effective implementation of the CED obligations by Mexico. In that regard, the Decision suggested supporting Mexico in two tasks: (i) offering assistance to carry out the duties related to the prevention of enforce disappearance; and (ii) the creation of an effective investigative mechanism to assist victims’ families (Decision, para. 123)).
The Decision was adopted under the scope of Article 34 of the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances (Convention). A discussion on the procedure of that article in relation to the case of Mexico can be found here and here. Nonetheless, academic commentary has not yet delved into the scope, content and effects of Article 34, particularly vis-à-vis a separate entity such as the UNGA. This post therefore aims to outline the content of the CED’s competence under Article 34 and its legal effects.
Article 34 and the CED competence
The CED is the treaty body created by the Convention. The CED’s mandate stems from the text of the treaty, under Article 26(1), spelling out the competences or functions the States Party empowered it with. These competences include, namely, (i) to review the reports submitted by States Party on their implementation of the Convention (articles 29(1) and (3)); (ii) to request the State Party to provide information on the situation of a disappeared person and make recommendations on that situation (articles 30(1) and (2)); (iii) to receive and consider individual communications on potential violations of the CED (article 31); (iv) to carry out in-situ visits in the territory of a State Party in the event of serious violations of the Convention (article 33); and (v) to bring the matter of systematic or widespread practice of enforced disappearance in a State Party to the UNGA (article 34).
Contrary to the competence to receive and consider individual communications, Article 34 of the Convention does not require the State Party to make a declaration of acceptance as a sine qua non condition for the CED to carry out said function (article 31(1)). The act of ratification or acceptance of the Convention by itself entails ascribing of legal force the competence of the CED under Article 34 to carry out that function (article 26 of the VCLT). Given that no State Party has made a reservation to this provision, none can object or deprive of legal effects a CED’s decision under this article. In that light, as noted by some objections raised to a reservation to the CED’s competence under article 33 of the Convention, it could be contended that a potential reservation to article 34 would be likewise understood as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention (see objections of Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Switzerland on Oman’s reservation to article 33).
Having had clarified the general scope of the CED competences, I intend to establish what is the scope and content of the competence of the CED within Article 34.
Moving on to the scope of the CED’s competence under Article 34 and according to the text of the Convention, the CED is empowered to “urgently bring the matter to the attention of the General Assembly” if two conditions are satisfied: (i) establish that the information received from a State Party unfolds indications of enforced disappearance “being practised on a widespread or systematic basis”, and (ii) seek “all relevant information on the situation” from the State Party concerned.
Crucially, the competence or function to “urgently bring the matter” is not creating an obligation upon the CED. The use of the expression “it may” before introducing said competence or function, denotes the use of a possibility. The Convention deliberately does not formulate a duty or an obligation through the use of “shall” or “must”. Therefore, in the event that the two conditions are met regarding the situation of a State Party, the CED would not be obliged to bring the “matter” to the attention of the UNGA.
What “situation” can the CED transmit to the attention of the UNGA?
The text of the provision does not define what “bring the matter to the attention of” means. Is the competence limited to notifying to the UNGA that a widespread or systematic situation of enforced disappearance is taking place?
To answer that question, the CED examined in the Decision (CED/C/MEX/A.34/D/1) the “information” supplied by an international NGO and determined that, prima facie, there appeared to be a widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance in Mexico (Decision, para. 43). In response, Mexico indicated to the CED that the incidents of enforced disappearance were not attributable to the State and that the measures adopted were aligned with its duties under the Convention (Decision, paras. 44-50). The measures referred to by Mexico are specifically of legislative (“adoption of local laws” and enactment of the “2017 General Act on Enforced Disappearance and the 2025 amendment thereto” and “presidential decree of 18 March 2025 instructing all states to intensify the search for missing persons”) and executive (“establishment of special prosecutors’ offices, missing persons’ commissions and coordination mechanisms”) nature (Decision, paras. 46, 48).
Following the text of Article 34 of the Convention and the practice of the CED regarding the case of Mexico (see Request for information submitted to Mexico, CED/C/MEX/A.34/RI/1 —Request—), the reference to “information” covers only the report or submission transmitted to the CED about the alleged practice of enforced disappearance in the territory of a State Party (Request, para. 13). The “information” per se cannot trigger the Article 34’s mechanism. There must be a preliminary examination by the CED of the “information” (Request, para. 11). In other words, whether from a “prima facie” exam of the facts raised in the “information” the CED can conclude the existence of a systematic or widespread nature of the practice of enforced disappearance in the territory of that State Party (Request, para. 23). Once that “prima facie” conclusion is reached, the CED is empowered by Article 34 to request the State Party to provide all relevant information that is limited to the scope of the “situation” as established by the CED. When using the term “situation”, it is possible to infer that the “information” initially supplied has transformed in terms of substance into a “situation”. Because there is a preliminary assessment made by the CED, under the authority deriving from its competence under Article 34, as to the existence of a potential violation of article 5 of the Convention -that provides for the criminalisation of enforced disappearance under international law- in a widespread or systematic scale (Request, para. 21).
From the foregoing it is possible to infer that the CED can only decide to refer the “situation” of a State Party to the UNGA after contrasting mainly two separate pieces of information: (i) the initial “information” received about the existence or not of a practice of enforced disappearance in the territory, and (ii) the position of the State Party regarding the information initially received. Although Article 34 of the Convention nor Section XXIV of the Rules of Procedure (RoP) that covers Article 34 mechanism regulate or detail how the assessment shall be conducted, the wording of the provision and the practice of the CED may prove supportive to clarify this scope.
In that moment, by contrasting the two pieces of information, the CED undertakes a comprehensive assessment. Contrary to the preliminary assessment explained above, in this step the CED undertakes a thorough review of the facts as raised in the “situation” and determines whether, in light of the response of the State Party and the applicable law, there are “well-founded indications” that the crime of enforced disappearance is committed in the territory of a State Party in a widespread or systematic scale, per Article 5 of the Convention (Decision, paras. 2, 51). In doing so, as indicated in the expression “applicable international law” used in Article 5 of the Convention, the CED relies on the codification of the constitutive elements of the crime of enforced disappearance under International Criminal Law (i.e. the Rome Statute) (Decision, para. 58). After assessing whether the facts raised in the “situation” appear to fall into the scope of the elements of the crime of enforced disappearance, the CED then concludes whether a decision to refer the case of a State Party to the UNGA is warranted. In that regard, the CED, albeit not using the term “matter” expressly to refer to the outcome of the assessment, used the term “situation” to conclude about the concurrence of “well-founded indications” that the crime of enforced disappearance is occurring in Mexico (Decision, paras. 121-122). Nonetheless, given the references to the wording of Article 34 (Decision, para. 115), it can be inferred that the use of the term “situation” in the conclusions about its assessment is equivalent to the term “matter” for the purposes of the implementation of this Convention provision (Decision, para. 122).
Certainly, it can be contended that the CED is not empowered to transmit only the initial “information” received. But there is no reference as to what steps the assessment should include nor an indication on whether the CED can request specific measures to be adopted.
Can the CED indicate to the UNGA what specific measures should be adopted on the “matter”?
In the Decision, the CED does not expressly indicate what the legal basis is justifying the competence to recommend to the UNGA specific measures to be adopted regarding the “matter” of Mexico (Decision, para. 122). Nor does the Convention, as indicated above, refer to this competence. In that light, before establishing what type of measures the CED can “put into consideration of” the UNGA to adopt (Decision, para. 123), the first question is whether the CED is empowered to do so. As discussed in the section above, the term “matter” under Article 34 of the Convention does not expand the scope of the CED competence to elaborate and transmit recommended actions for the UNGA to adopt. For that reason, it is relevant to verify whether the regulation of the procedure incorporates or develops further the content of the decision the CED can elaborate.
As per the procedure, Article 26(6) of the Convention empowers the CED to adopt its RoP. Nonetheless, the RoP do not foresee at any point that the CED can recommend to the UNGA what measures it should adopt or consider. When addressing the procedure under Article 34 of the Convention, particularly the moment at which the CED will decide to bring the “matter” or not to the attention of the UNGA (article 106 RoP), the Rules do not provide the option to include measures to be considered by the UNGA. From a regulatory standpoint, the CED would only be limited to carrying out an assessment as to the existence of incidents of enforced disappearance and their widespread or systematic nature in light of the Convention. The results of which would be transmitted to the UNGA in the decision to be adopted.
This conclusion appears to be confirmed by the travaux préparatoires of the Convention. The discussions of the Intersessional Open-Ended Working Group considered a twofold object for this provision: (i) that the CED would not “indicate” to the UNGA or the UN Secretary-General what measures to adopt in that “matter”, but only limit its competence to bringing the “matter” to its attention (E/CN.4/2006/57, paras. 61-63); and (ii) that the scope would be like other treaty provisions namely, Article VIII to the Genocide Convention (GC) (E/CN.4/2005/66, para. 139).
Consequently, the CED has no competence to put forward any measure for the consideration of the UNGA when it addresses the “matter”, notwithstanding suggestions the CED can forward to the UNGA as will be discussed below.
Article 34 and the UNGA discretion
Notwithstanding the CED’s inability to recommend specific measures, there appears to be two potential reasons to justify the submission of these recommendations in the Decision: (i) the relationship between Articles 34 and 28(1) of the Convention; and (ii) the “ultima ratio” nature of Article 34.
On one hand, the relationship envisaged by the drafters between Articles 34 of the Convention and VIII GC illustrates the intention of calling upon the UNGA to adopt the measures it deems appropriate within its competence to address this “matter” (Genocide Convention, para. 427; Gambia v Myanmar, para. 88). In that light, it appears that the competence to decide what measures should be adopted to address the “matter” rests solely on the UNGA. However, the relationship above does not preclude the intention of the CED to cooperate with the UNGA by indicating some measures for its consideration particularly, when said intention is founded in a duty or obligation of the CED. As foreseen in Article 28(1) of the Convention, the CED has a duty to cooperate with the organs of the UN “[i]n the framework of [its] competences”. One of those competences being to call upon the UNGA to adopt the measures to be deemed appropriate before the existence of widespread or systematic enforced disappearance.
On the other hand, it could be contended that the CED, when carrying out its function under Article 34 of the Convention, is ensuring the respect and application of the Convention by the States Party. Following the ICJ position in the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo judgement (para. 66), the CED is carrying out a monitoring power by which the detection of systematic or widespread practice of enforced disappearance can be referred to the UNGA to adopt measures to address and revert said practice. The parallel is likewise relevant given the first-hand knowledge of the CED on the “situation”, after carrying out an examination of the practice of enforced disappearance in the territory and considering the position of the State Party in question.
However, that would only be possible by interpreting Article 34 jointly with Articles 30, 31 and 33 of the Convention which foresee the other CED competences within the monitoring function (urgent action, individual communications and in-situ visits). Thus, the gravity of the “situation” and its categorization as a widespread or systematic practice supports the reading of Article 34 procedure as an exceptional venue to have recourse to after exhausting other procedures (see E/CN.4/2005/66, para. 139). In the case of Mexico, the Decision (paras. 9-32) identifies exhaustively the recourse to these other procedures since 2012 in several cases involving incidents of enforced disappearance before triggering Article 34 procedure. Accordingly, the extensive engagement of the CED with Mexico would ascribe persuasive value to the recommended measures in light of its case-knowledge and specific mandate under the Convention.
Hence, rather than a competence to indicate to the UNGA what measures to adopt, the CED may recommend measures for the UNGA to consider in light of its duty to cooperate with the UNGA or the recommendations made in the course of other procedures aimed at ensuring the State Party’s fulfilment of its Convention obligations.
Conclusion
The case concerning Mexico has unfolded the scope, content and limits of the competence of the CED under Article 34 of the Convention. The use of the concepts, namely “information”, “situation” and “matter” has proven useful to understand the legal requirements the CED must meet in each step of the Article 34 procedure before adopting a decision to refer a case to the UNGA. Even if the CED receives “information” about the alleged practice of enforced disappearance in the territory of a State Party, given the lack of legal obligation to act, the decision to trigger Article 34 remains at the discretion of the CED. Should the CED decide to do so, the competence that is attributed consists of mainly two actions: (i) establish, on a “prima facie” basis, if from the “information” received a credible, reliable set of facts unfold the potential commission of the crime of enforced disappearance -the moment from which the “information” becomes a “situation”; and (ii) assess, after receiving the response from the State Party about the “situation” (the preliminary assessment on the existence or not of a crime under Article 5 of the Convention), if the facts related to the “situation” appear to show the concurrence of the constitutive elements of the crime of enforced disappearance under International Criminal Law. To conclude that there are “well-founded indications” of the existence of the crime, after hearing the State Party concerned and using as benchmark the codification of the crime of enforced disappearance, would allow the CED to transmit the “matter” to the UNGA.
Further, the brief analysis of Article 34 of the Convention, including the travaux préparatoires, has not found that the competence of the CED to refer the “matter” to the UNGA includes likewise to recommend to the UN organ to consider what measures should be adopted. As confirmed by the lack of express treaty or regulatory provisions that provide a legal basis for this section of the Decision. Nevertheless, the analysis has demonstrated that the indication of measures to be considered by the UNGA may fall into the scope of Article 28(1) of the Convention when read together with Article 34. In other words, that the indication of recommended actions to be considered by the UNGA may be understood as the fulfilment of the duty to cooperate with the UN because the CED is acting within the exceptional procedure of Article 34. Moreover, the indication of measures appears to be likewise justified with the first-hand knowledge of the case concerning Mexico in the exercise of the CED’s competence to monitor the situation of enforced disappearance within States Parties.
Diego Sanchez Borjas (ORCID) is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant in Public International Law and Member of the Research Group on Public International Law and International Relations at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona). The project that gave rise to this post received the support of a fellowship from “Fundación Ramón Areces”