We are living in what could turn out to be a defining moment in global politics. As if the early 21st century state of consequent crises would not have been enough in itself for questioning the capacity of the global normative order to deliver, the unprecedented chasm that has emerged among its liberal proponents together with blatant disrespect of its most basic principles, has raised concern of its collapse. The US military operation in Venezuela, Donald Trump´s threat to invade (or buy) Greenland, and the use of tariffs as a lever to promote unilateral goals has caused a potentially irreparable lack of trust between the US and a range of its earlier closest allies.
In the heated repositioning of foreign policies, ideology is phased out for the benefit of domestic gains and needs, covered in the veil of pragmatism. As an expression of this, on the 7th of January 2026, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from 66 international organizations identified as “wasteful, ineffective, and harmful”. These organizations are by the Trump administration considered to advance their own agendas, contrary to the interests of the US, hereby threatening the “nation’s sovereignty, freedoms, and general prosperity”. Above all, the statement deplores that international organizations no longer adhere to their pragmatic origins but have become “dominated by progressive ideology”.
There may be hurdles ahead for the materialization of at least some of the withdrawals, but it is likely that all the organizations will be affected at least through loss of financial contributions. While everyone can find their own “worst case” in these withdrawals, the trend of the Trump administration is clear, as these come on top of earlier withdrawals from the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and the International Coffee Organization, and cuts in funding to the UNRWA and the WTO. While the mandates of the organizations from which the US withdraws vary widely, most of them are undoubtedly active in policy areas the protection of which we are accustomed to think as falling within the interests of the international community as a whole such as UN Women, UN Habitat, the UNFPA, the UNFCCC and the IPCC.
Member state withdrawals are a part of the lifecycle of international organizations. States can choose to become members, and they can choose to leave at their own discretion. The only restrictions on membership is that all states cannot become members of all organizations, as members may be required to display certain features, commit to particular values, be from a particular region, or be part of a group of states with particular interests (such as production of oil, cocoa, or wine). Although exits from membership sometimes may be the end of an organization, more commonly it is not (think e.g. about Brexit or the Council of Europe). What any exit does affect, however, is the capacity of an organization to achieve its purposes. It does so in a material sense and can affect its political leverage, but more crucially, it affects the possibility of formulating and promoting community interests.
International organizations have become the epitome for dealing with problems that states cannot solve on their own, and conceptually embody the idea of community interest. In its most idealistic sense this “interest” embraces the “greater interests of humanity and planetary welfare” and even the “salvation of mankind”. The concept comes with the promise that international law serves interests transcending those of individual states, including human rights and environmental commons. Yet, “community interest” is not easily defined. The scope of the community need not be universal, and the interests covered may conflict both across international law regimes and/or within them. This is reflected also in the versatile group of international organizations. Organizations such as NATO, OPEC, OIC or the EU may possibly contribute to global public goods but will by definition primarily promote a community interest between a smaller group of states. For this reason the priority of certain community interests over other values and interests, including states’ interests, in the legitimation of international law cannot be taken for granted.
International organizations play a central role in shaping community interests. Performing this function can even be foundational for the very resilience of international law, as recently evidenced for example by the ILC settlement of the question of statehood of small island states. There is also a certain permanency to community interests once forged. For this reason multilateralism is likely to continue in the frameworks that the US is abandoning. Although there will be a “US-sized hole”, and the consequent leadership void will affect for example climate change work negatively, a community interest does not disappear by the exit even of a powerful state, since that interest is not reducible to one single state.
All good, in other words, for continued multilateral collaboration? Along came the World Economic Forum in Davos where Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada on the 20th January 2026 delivered a speech that was met with standing ovations. The old world order is not coming back, the message was, and for good reason, since that order has become a tool for subordination and the pursuit of the interests of great powers. What is needed is “principled pragmatism” – a notion earlier coined by the President of Finland and defined as “a set of universal values based on freedom, human rights and international rules that take into account the realities of global diversity, culture and history of the nation-states, regions and continents”. Global problems cannot be solved only with those who share the same values, the message is, but requires “coalitions that work issue by issue with partners who share enough common ground to act together”.
While the speech marks a clear stance against the new world order propagated by Trump, it also seems to echo some of the underlying reasoning. To begin with, the old order is about to be at least partially dismantled. For Trump this follows from the negative impact on US sovereignty and prosperity of some of international law´s actors, whereas for Carney it follows from that law being susceptible to imperialism (to the detriment of domestic sovereignty and prosperity). Furthermore, whereas for Trump multilateralism has become too ideological, for Carney multilateralism has been too naïve (which arguably could be interpreted to mean – ideological). The answer? Pragmatism!
It is tempting to underline pragmatism in times when so much is at stake in terms of the future of international law. As solidarity among earlier like-minded evaporates, agreements are treated as void of normative value, and fundamental principles are undermined, world politics resembles more and more a competition among self-interested states for every day that passes. While pragmatism is not as a point of departure synonymous with realism, invoking it as an antithesis to ideals comes close enough. The notion of “value-based pragmatism” seeks to square this binary picture. It serves to communicate respect for and global promotion of values such as human rights, while accepting limitations to those rights for example in face of threats to national interests. Finland certainly practices what it preaches, as exemplified by the Finnish Border Security Act. It may now be more important than ever to “design institutions, alliances, and strategies to secure peace rather than sit and watch as Trump rewinds the clock”. But building “coalitions” and “alliances” can mean many things. As a building block in an emerging tripolar world order it can be a pragmatic strategy for ensuring that the third power is Europe instead of Russia. As a call for “middle powers” to unite it promises to challenge a tripolar world order altogether for the benefit of working together “issue by issue” – another form of pragmatism.
International law has always been about cooperation with those that “share enough”, and with disrespect for political reasons as a thorn in its side since day one. This law has in many respects emerged out of pragmatic problem-solving (cf. the establishment of the Universal Postal Union), but has developed a capacity to find shared pathways where initially none has been in sight (cf. climate change). Value-based pragmatism emerges in response to an undermining of the very structures that have made this forging possible in the first place, but risks becoming complicit in its disassembly. Despite assuring commitment to shared values such as human rights and the rule of law, value-based pragmatism seems to be more about upholding a “rules-based order” than the “international legal system”. The difference is not only conceptual. The former can comprise values of the latter but can also be regarded as an alternative regime outside the discipline of international law; one that is open for double standards, exceptionalism, and hypocrisy. “Issue by issue” solutions that “take into account the realities of global diversity” should not lose sight of the need to forge community interests also in the future, especially in those situations where there may initially be little in terms of shared values to depart from.
Viljam Engström, Adjunct professor (Docent), Senior Lecturer in Public International Law at Åbo Akademi University, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4908-0158. The author has a keen interest in conceptual issues of international law and international organizations in particular.