The Value of Article 18 in the Convention System
Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was largely overlooked until the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) began finding violations in 2004. The provision, titled “Limitation on use of restrictions on rights” states:
“The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed”.
A more fitting title might be “Improper use of restrictions”. However, a plain reading of the text offers limited insight into its purpose. Examining the preparatory works clarifies its intent. The Italian representative, Mr Benvenuti, explained:
“In my opinion, what we must fear today is not the seizure of power by totalitarianism by means of violence, but rather that totalitarianism will attempt to put itself in power by pseudo-legitimate means. Experience has shown that it is sufficient to establish an atmosphere of intimidation and terror in one single electoral campaign in a country for all the executive acts establishing a totalitarian regime to acquire a character, an appearance, of legality. That is exactly what happened with us. For example, the Italian constitution was never repealed, all constitutional principles remained in theory, but the special laws approved by the Chambers, elected in one misdirected campaign, robbed the constitution little by little of all its substance, especially of its substance of freedom”.
His statement underscores Article 18’s function: preventing authoritarian regimes from dismantling democratic freedoms under the guise of legality. By exposing such abuses before they become irreversible, Article 18 seeks to preserve the rule of law.
This rationale also informed the creation of a monitoring body for the ECHR. The French jurist Pierre-Henri Teitgen, often regarded as the ECtHR’s intellectual architect, stated during the ECHR’s drafting:
“Democracies do not become Nazi countries in one day. Evil progresses cunningly, with a minority operating, as it were, to remove the levers of control. One by one freedoms are suppressed, in one sphere after another. Public opinion and the entire conscience are killed… It is necessary to intervene before it is too late. A conscience must exist somewhere which will sound the alarm to the minds of a nation menaced by this progressive corruption, to warn them of the peril… An international Court, within the Council of Europe, and a system of supervision and guarantees, could be the conscience of which we all have need”.[i]
This statement highlights that the ECtHR was established to prevent the rise of regimes akin to the Nazis, which threatened democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, foundational principles enshrined in the Charter of the Council of Europe (CoE). In this sense, Article 18, the very existence of the ECtHR and the CoE are deeply intertwined.
The Risk in Article 18 Cases
Before 2004, the ECtHR had never found a violation of Article 18. The first such ruling came in Gusinsky v. Russia. Between 2004 and March 2025, the Court has found Article 18 violations in 29 cases involving eight countries, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine, which I name as the “Article 18 club”. Azerbaijan leads the club with 11 cases, followed by Russia with 7 cases, and Turkey with 4 cases. The last ruling of an A 18 violation came in an inter-state case (Ukraine v. Russia – Re Crimea). These states generally do not rank among Europe’s established democracies. In nearly all cases, the ECtHR determined that governments had engaged in politically motivated prosecutions and convictions to suppress dissent or marginalise political opponents. The political motivation is often concealed behind alleged illegal commercial, civil society, or political activities deemed contrary to public order or national security.
Within the ECHR system, Article 18 does not have an autonomous role; it can only be applied in conjunction with other Convention provisions. However, a violation of Article 18 can still occur in connection with another Article, even if that Article is not independently breached. The most related provision in Article 18 cases is Article 5 ECHR, which guarantees the right to personal liberty and security. Many victims of Article 18 violations are arrested, detained, and convicted based on with baseless or even fabricated accusations. The law enforcement and the judiciary frequently collaborate with the executive to achieve politically motivated objectives.
Yet, another important fact that the vast majority of the Article 18 judgments finding a violation remain unexecuted. Even where execution has occurred, systemic reforms to prevent future violations are absent. Some government officials have openly refused to implement rulings finding an Article 18 violation. In some cases, national courts attempted defying the A 18 rulings of the ECtHR.
Conclusion
As outlined above, Article 18 is essential to the ECHR, safeguarding the CoE’s foundational principles. The failure to enforce judgments identifying violations of Article 18 represents an implicit challenge to the CoE’s legitimacy by its own member states. Ordinarily, such defiance within an organisation would not be tolerated. Yet, these are not normal times.
The CoE’s Committee of Ministers has refrained from imposing sanctions on states refusing to implement Article 18 rulings. This lack of enforcement suggests that political and economic interests have been prioritised over the foundational values of a supranational human rights system. Consequently, Article 18 cases, in the view of this author, along with the states that violate them and the institutions that tolerate such violations, undermine the very existence of European human rights protection.
Olgun Akbulut is a professor of human rights and constitutional law permanently based at Kadir Has University, Faculty of Law (Istanbul/Turkey) and currently on a research stay at the European Centre for Minority Issues (Flensburg/Germany).
[i] Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Vol I: Preparatory Commission of the Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Consultative Assembly, 11 May-8 September 1949) (Martinus Nijhoff 1975) 292.